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Abstract: Anger is often an appropriate reaction to harms and injustices, but is it a 
beneficial one? Martha Nussbaum (2015; 2016) has argued that, although useful in 
initially recruiting agents for action, anger is typically ineffective and often 
counterproductive to securing the political aims of the oppressed. Nussbaum argues that 
to be effective at enacting social change, groups and individuals alike, must move quickly 
out of states of anger. Feminist theorists, on the other hand, have for long highlighted the 
efficacy of anger, as well as its moral and epistemic value, in fighting against the 
oppressive status quo (Frye, 1983; Lorde, 1984; Narayan, 1988). It might be thought, 
therefore, that for political action to be effective, a continued state of anger is preferable. 
I present a novel, empirically informed, defense against Nussbaum’s attack on anger’s 
efficacy in political action. Nussbaum adheres to a traditional view on the nature of anger, 
which holds that anger constitutively involves a desire for retribution. The view that anger 
is ineffective falls out of this and is dominant in the literature, as well our everyday lives. 
Informed by work in social psychology, I argue that anger is far more effective than 
Nussbaum allows. This will give us cause to reconsider the traditional view of anger’s 
nature that Nussbaum endorses. In doing so, I highlight anger’s aim for recognition, rather 
than retribution, as key. I also uncover conditions that favour anger’s political efficacy, 
as well as reasons for why the traditional view of anger has been so pervasive.  
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1. Introduction 
Injustices call for outrage. Nelson Mandela (1994: 257), for example, famously wrote: 
 
I had no epiphany, no singular revelation, no moment of truth, but a steady accumulation of a 
thousand slights, a thousand indignities and a thousand unremembered moments produced in me 
an anger, a rebelliousness, a desire to fight the system that imprisoned my people. 
 
That anger is a powerful motivator of political action is ubiquitously acknowledged 
(Adams, 1986; Jasper, 2014). Granting anger an initial motivational role leaves open the 
question of whether oppressed groups will be most effective at securing significant 
change by sustaining and promoting anger at their targets, or, alternatively, by moving 
quickly out of states of anger. Nussbaum (2015; 2016) has launched a contemporary 
attack on anger, arguing that, beyond its initial motivational role, anger is ineffective, and 
more than often counterproductive, in fights for social justice.1 Nussbaum therefore 
recommends against anger in such political struggles. I follow Nussbaum (2015; 2016) 
in using ‘anger’ to refer to a range of related affective phenomena, including outrage, 
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indignation and resentment. By anger I will mean occurrent cases of phenomenologically 
salient negatively valanced states that involve evaluations, or appraisals, of a triggering 
situation as wrongful. Like many emotions, anger is thought to have both a cognitive 
component, that represents the world as being a certain way, and a conative component, 
that disposes agents for action (Deonna and Teroni, 2012; Cogley, 2014). Nussbaum’s 
recent attack targets feminist philosophers, as well as many political activists, who hail 
anger as amongst, if not the most, politically important emotion (Frye, 1983; Narayan, 
1988; hooks, 1995; Lorde, 1997; Lugones, 2003; Bell, 2005; Srinivasan, 2018). Lorde 
(1997: 280), for example, writes that “every woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger 
potentially useful against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which brought 
that anger into being” Anger is thought to create and sustain a sense of moral obligation 
and justice that propels political progress (Jaspers, 2014).  
In this chapter I develop an empirically informed critique of Nussbaum’s position. 
We will see that empirical work provides support in favour of anger’s political efficacy. 
I begin by outlining Nussbaum’s commitments and highlighting two empirical claims 
amongst them (sec. 2). I then proceed to challenge these claims by bringing recent work 
in social psychology to bear on them (sec. 3). Doing so will call into question the ancient 
conception of anger that Nussbaum, and many contemporary philosophers, endorse (sec. 
4). I end by offering a pluralist conception of anger that should be preferred (sec. 5). My 
alternative view makes desires for recognition central to anger, and allows the full 
efficacy of anger to emerge.  
 
2. Nussbaum on Anger 
 
Nussbaum (2015; 2016) endorses an ancient construal of anger as constitutively involving 
a desire for retribution.2 Aristotle characterizes anger as “a desire accompanied by pain 
for perceived revenge caused by a perceived slight” (Rhet. 1378a31-33).3 Anger ceases 
when the offender “pays back for the offense; for revenge stops anger” (NE 1126a21-22). 
The desire for the perpetrator’s suffering is a conceptual part of anger on such a view, as 
anger is defined as a desire for returning pain (DA 403a31). This retributive view of anger 
is widespread in contemporary philosophy (see Pettigrove, 2012 and Ben-Ze’ev, 2000: 
384), indeed Nussbaum (2015: 4) calls it the “traditional” view of anger. Nussbaum’s 
thought is not that anger always involves a desire for violent revenge or to personally 
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harm the offender, rather, “anger involves, conceptually, a wish for things to go badly, 
somehow, for the offender in a way that is envisaged, somehow, however vaguely, as a 
payback for the offense” (Nussbaum, 2015: 46). For example, when angry at a friend’s 
betrayal, one may wish for the traitor’s life to go badly, yet not wish to have anything to 
do with making this the case.4 Nussbaum’s view on anger involves the following nature 
claim: 
 
nature claim: Anger constitutively involves a desire for payback or retribution.5 
 
Given its nature, Nussbaum takes anger to be either irrational or immoral. It is irrational 
in the sense that inflicting pain upon a perpetrator when in anger will not literally undo 
the wrong one has suffered. An agent who believes the contrary is guilty of “magical 
thinking” and irrationality (2015: 47-48). The only way to avoid irrationality is to 
construe the payback as capable of restoring one’s status following a slight. Anger is on 
such a reading concerned with status-ranking, where “a retaliatory strike back is thought 
to restore the balance of status” (2015: 48). The problem with status-focused anger, for 
Nussbaum (2015), is that it is immoral as it involves a “narcissistic error” (51), an 
obsessive focus on one’s standing relative to others (45). There is, however, one domain 
in which Nussbaum (2015: 50) grants that slights do lower one’s status, and that to be 
preoccupied with such status injuries is not immoral. 
 
Discrimination, for example, on grounds of race or gender, is often conceived as an injury that 
really does consist in down-ranking, and there is truth to this, just in this special sense: 
discrimination involves a denial of a special status of equal dignity, and this status has intrinsic 
value. 
 
But, she goes on to say that “the idea that denials of equal dignity can be rectified by 
bringing the injurer low is a false lure” (2015: 51). Nussbaum seems to think that anger 
is an inadequate way to promote positive social change for two reasons: inefficacy and 
immorality. On the latter she writes that “reversing positions through payback does not 
create equality. It just substitutes one inequality for another” (2015: 51). Here much more 
could be said. Surely lowering the rank of those in power need not involve the reversal 
of positions within a hierarchy, but merely equalizing them. It is unclear why such an aim 
would make the status-lowering strategy morally problematic. I will leave these issues to 
one side. My focus will be on the claim of inefficacy. Nussbaum argues that “non-anger 
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and a generous disposition are far more useful” than anger to revolutionary justice (2016: 
228). Nussbaum doesn’t just make comparative claims regarding anger’s efficacy 
however, she also argues, largely counterfactually, that leaders of successful social 
movements, such as Martin Luther King and Mandela, were effective precisely because 
they did not act on their anger.6 Nussbaum takes anger to be particularly ineffective in 
the fight for social justice. This claim can be summarized as follows: 
 
inefficacy claim: Anger is typically ineffective at fighting social injustice. 
 
This claim is by no means limited to Nussbaum (2015: 2016). Seneca (1928) famously 
paints anger as “the most hideous and frenzied of all emotions” which gives “no thought 
to itself if only it can hurt another” and is “eager for revenge though it may drag down 
the avenger along with it” (I.1). Casting anger as counterproductive has a long history 
(see Srinivasan, 2018), and is common in everyday life, where we are often advised to 
avoid anger on account of it being futile, and potentially counterproductive, in situations 
that trigger the emotion.7 More recently, Pettigrove (2012) has argued that anger is 
particularly ineffective in struggles for social justice, and claims meekness is preferable. 
What are the specific reasons for holding the inefficacy claim? The answer becomes clear 
when we pay closer attention to the nature claim. First, as anger is constitutively aimed 
at payback, retributive rather than conciliatory actions are predicted of those in anger. 
Retributory actions are both morally problematic for Nussbaum, and risk being 
counterproductive (Nussbaum, 2016: 1). They are morally problematic, because they 
involve harming, or at least seeking to harm, their objects. They are counterproductive 
because in so doing, they may harm the angry agent themselves, often by triggering 
disengagement or retaliation in their targets, which leads to the further entrenchment of 
conflict (Nussbaum, 2015; 2016).  
When enraged African-Americans flooded the streets of Chicago following 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination in 1968 for example, 125 fires were set, 210 
buildings were damaged and numerous stores were looted. In response to the riot, over 
10,000 police and 5000 soldiers were brought in. Many African-Americans were killed, 
injured or incarcerated, the city of Chicago suffered a food shortage, and the areas 
destroyed by rioters were knocked down, many remaining to this day undeveloped. Racial 
segregation intensified in the aftermath of the riot (Risen, 2009). Besides committing 
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harms against Chicagoans in general, these actions arguably left the city’s African-
American community itself worse off. This seems to lend support to Nussbaum’s view 
that anger often makes things worse for the angry agent, as it is “incompatible with 
forward-looking pragmatism” (2016: 230–233). 
There is, however, clear room to argue for the efficacy, and even justification, of 
destructive actions in fights for social justice. Indeed, the Chicago riots are thought to 
have played a crucial role in paving the way for important victories for the civil rights 
movement (Risen, 2009). The efficacy or ethics of aggressive revolutionary tactics is 
however not the focus of this chapter. In so far as Nussbaum envisions anger being 
effective, she sees it as morally condemnable for harming others (2015: 51). Nussbaum 
would therefore not deny that anger can be effective, but rather deny that anger can be 
effective while remaining morally unproblematic. Anger’s efficacy therefore seems 
inexorably tied to its immorality on her account. This is the narrower claim of inefficacy 
I will be concerned with. There are two, in my eyes both fruitful, main strategies against 
this stance: to argue for the morality of some retributive actions, or to argue that anger’s 
ties to retribution are far weaker than Nussbaum allows. I pursue the latter strategy here. 
We will see that effective, morally unproblematic, anger is far more robust than 
Nussbaum’s account allows.  
The first reason for holding the inefficacy claim then is that in aiming for 
retribution, angry subjects act destructively, which we might think is unlikely to improve 
the angry party’s standing, and can indeed worsen their situation by antagonizing the 
targets of anger and provoking retaliation. Independently of the specific actions taken, 
commitment to the nature claim gives reason to think that mere displays, or 
communications, of anger risk setting back goals for positive social change. This 
highlights a second, related, reason anger is taken to be ineffective in struggles for 
revolutionary justice: that communicating anger, for those committed to the nature claim, 
involves communicating the desire for retribution, and this is likely to inspire animosity 
in the targeted group. Nussbaum (2016) says that anger “breed(s) mistrust” (233) and 
increases “anxiety and self-defensiveness” in its targets (230). Similarly, Pettigrove 
(2012) writes that anger communication is typically counterproductive due to “triggering 
a defensive response” in its targets that prevents them from appreciating the causes of 
anger (367). In a best-case scenario, the communication of anger is unlikely to breed 
openness to cooperation in its targets. In a worst-case scenario anger risks perpetuating 
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an “endless cycle of blood vengeance” by escalating conflicts (Nussbaum, 2016: 1). There 
might be other reasons for endorsing the inefficacy claim, but I will focus on the two just 
outlined. The first is a reason that pertains primarily to the actions of those in anger, while 
the second is a reason that pertains to the responses of the targets of anger. The two 
reasons can be summarized as follows: 
 
In-group Reason: Anger motivates retributive actions on the part of those angry.  
Out-group Reason: Anger antagonizes those at whom it is directed. 
 
Each reason is in effect an empirical claim against which recent experimental work can 
be brought to bear. Before I turn to doing so, I would like to note the one exception 
Nussbaum (2015; 2016) makes, the one case in which she takes anger to be an effective 
and moral way of promoting social change: cases of what she calls “transition-anger”. 
Nussbaum characterizes transition-anger as anger that is not retributive, and which 
focuses on “brotherhood”, “justice”, “reconciliation and shared effort” instead, typically 
motivating constructive actions (2015: 53-54). This is the type of anger Nussbaum takes 
Martin Luther King to experience and express in his speeches (54). Nussbaum isn’t clear 
on whether transition-anger is a distinct species of anger on her view: “is Transition-
Anger a species of anger? I really don’t care how we answer this question” (2015: 54), 
what is clear is that she takes it to be a “borderline case” that is “rare and exceptional” 
and only present in individuals with superior “self-discipline” (54). In sum, Nussbaum’s 
view on anger takes it to be typically ineffective in struggles for social justice. The only 
room made for the permissible efficacy of an emotion akin to anger, is the special case of 
transition-anger that is exceedingly rare and hard to cultivate. 
To the question ‘should the oppressed avoid anger?’ Nussbaum responds in the 
affirmative.8 Nussbaum’s targets are feminist philosophers who have issued powerful 
responses to the above question in the negative (Frye, 1983; Narayan, 1988; hooks, 1995; 
Lorde, 1997; Lugones, 2003; Bell, 2005; Srinivasan, 2018). The oppressed should not 
avoid anger, on their view, for a number of reasons. These include anger’s psychological, 
epistemic, as well as practical, utility in resisting oppression.9 Here I am concerned with 
the practical. Feminist philosophers are opposed to the inefficacy claim, as they take anger 
to be crucial in motivating politically beneficial action. Lorde (1997: 280) claims that 
anger  
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can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change. And when I speak of change, I 
do not mean a simple switch of positions or a temporary lessening of tensions, nor the ability to smile 
or feel good. I am speaking of a basic and radical alteration in those assumptions underlining our lives. 
 
Those who have argued for the political value of anger have rarely engaged in a head on 
denial of the inefficacy claim however.10 This is likely in part because such a task is 
largely an empirical one (see Lepoutre 2018: 3; Srinivasan 2018: 127). By attending to 
relevant empirical work, my challenge to the inefficacy claim takes steps towards filling 
this gap in support of those who have hailed anger as paramount for political change.  
 
3. The Efficacy of Anger 
 
We saw that there are two reasons in support of the inefficacy claim. The In-group Reason 
and the Out-group Reason, both of which are in fact empirical claims that generate 
empirical predictions. The former predicts retributive behaviour of angry subjects, while 
the latter predicts targets of anger to respond defensively, and often retaliate, against those 
who display anger towards them. A look at relevant empirical work will give us cause to 
question both reasons for the inefficacy claim. I deal with them in turn.  
 
3.1 The In-group Reason 
Anger is seen as a crucial motivator of collective political action (Spring et al., 2018). 
The field of collective action research takes there to be two main pathways by which 
collective action is motivated: the anger pathway, and the instrumental reasoning pathway 
(van Zomeren et al., 2012; Wlodarczyk et al., 2017). The anger pathway involves the 
experience of group anger being triggered by a situation of unfair in-group disadvantage, 
while the instrumental reasoning pathway involves reasoning about how effective one’s 
group will be at changing the unjust situation.11 The anger pathway is driven by 
appraising situations as unfair, while the instrumental reasoning pathway is driven by 
evaluating the amount of social support for action one expects. The latter involves 
reasoning about how successful the group is likely to be at ensuring change through 
collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2012).12  
Given the In-group Reason for holding the inefficacy claim, a supporter of this 
claim would plausibly expect the actions typical of each of these pathways to differ. 
DRAFT- Please cite published version in: The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves ed. Ana Falcato 




Nussbaum would likely expect the instrumental reasoning pathway of collective action 
alone to motivate morally unproblematic actions in the pursuit of justice. Retributive 
collective actions, on the other hand, would be expected of the anger pathway. 
Experimental work on collective action seriously challenges these predictions however.  
In a key study, German university students were surveyed regarding a real-life 
situation where the state had mandated an increase in tuition fees. Students were asked to 
indicate how likely they would be to participate in different actions against the tuition 
rise. The action options were grouped into three types; a) ‘constructive actions’ such as 
flyer dissemination, petition signing and demonstrations, b) ‘destructive actions’ such as 
arson attacks on university buildings or private property and c) ‘intermediate type’ actions 
that disturb events where tuition-rise advocates appear, such as blocking university 
buildings or public roads (Tausch et al., 2011). Adherents of the inefficacy claim would 
plausibly predict the anger pathway to mainly motivate actions of type b), destructive 
actions, perhaps as well as intermediate type c) actions, while predicting instrumental 
reasoning to be the main pathway for motivating actions of type a), constructive actions. 
On the contrary, however, both anger and instrumental reasoning were found to be 
positively related to engaging in type a) actions, i.e. constructive actions. Indeed, anger 
was found to be inversely correlated to destructive actions, being most strongly correlated 
with constructive actions. Crucially, anger was not found to significantly motivate actions 
that involved enacting payback in any straightforward sense (destructive or intermediate 
types of actions), as anger motivated actions to change the tuition fee policy, rather than 
harm those who implemented it.  
Similar results were found outside of laboratory settings in studies involving 
Muslim Indian minority communities in conflict with the Hindu majority (van Zomeren 
et al., 2004; Tausch et al., 2011). The Muslim community is one of the most 
disadvantaged communities in the country in terms of education, income, employment 
and political representation (Basant 2007). The self-reported levels of anger amongst the 
Muslim community in the riot-prone city of Aligarh, were found to be unrelated to any 
support for violent actions against the dominant majority. This suggests that the results 
of the study conducted on students may extend to real world situations of historical 
conflict. Other studies have found anger in situations of group conflict, such as Israel-
Palestine, to promote both destructive actions, as well as constructive actions, against the 
out-group (Halperin 2008). This evidence still speaks against the first reason for holding 
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the inefficacy claim, as anger is not shown to motivate destructive actions over 
constructive ones.  
 Some have cited studies that show anger to motivate punitive and aggressive 
actions (see Pettigrove 2012 for example). Nussbaum and supporters of her view would 
likely try to explain away the constructive effects of anger I just surveyed as exceptions 
to this trend. A few points on this. First, the experimental evidence relied upon to support 
the inefficacy claim is almost exclusively from studies done on individuals or in 
interpersonal settings (Pettigrove 2012: 362; Spring et al., 2018), therefore we should be 
skeptical of how they translate to the inter-group, and often systemic, dynamics we are 
concerned with. Furthermore, below we will see that there is ample evidence of anger 
being constructive in interpersonal settings as well, which those arguing against anger’s 
efficacy have long neglected. Most importantly however, I have not denied that anger can 
trigger destructive actions, the point is that constructive anger-triggered actions might be 
far more common than those who condemn anger grant, and indeed constructive effects 
might be just as typical, or even paradigmatic, of anger.  
How do we account for the variance in anger’s motivational tendencies? This is 
the question that guides much empirical work. The experimental work suggests that key 
factors moderate the effects of anger. In psychology, moderators are crucial to 
determining when certain effects hold. Moderators are typically contextual variables that 
influence which effects are observed. Contextual moderators are likely crucial to 
determining when anger will motivate constructive or destructive actions. The Tausch et 
al. (2011) study for example, found destructive type b) actions to be favored when the 
group had low confidence in their ability to change their predicament. This suggests that 
taking a situation to be unchangeable may be a key factor in motivating destructive 
behavior. Indeed, there is wide ranging evidence that punitive actions are favoured in 
situations where change is unlikely. This is often because the out-group is unresponsive 
to attempts to change the situation (Bandura, 2000). Indeed, some have called this the 
‘nothing to lose’ phenomenon (Scheepers et al., 2006) as the low status group has little 
to lose in responding to injustice aggressively, seeing as their situation is unlikely to 
change by any other means. The perceived changeability of the out-group in relation to 
an anger triggering situation, then, seems to be a key moderator of anger behaviour. This 
suggests that whether the In-group Reason holds or not is heavily dependent on how 
changeable, or receptive to change, the outgroup is perceived to be.  
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In sum, we have seen the In-group Reason for holding the inefficacy claim to be 
challenged by recent empirical work. Contrary to the prediction that anger motivates 
destructive, or retributive, collective actions, a range of studies in the field of collective 
action have failed to establish a significant relation between anger and the motivation of 
such actions. Indeed, in complete opposition to this prediction, anger was observed to 
significantly motivate constructive actions instead. Even when anger was observed to 
correlate with destructive actions, it was also observed to correlate significantly with 
constructive actions. The key notion of moderators has been introduced, and I have 
highlighted a moderator that is likely to play a central role in determining when anger 
motivates constructive actions.  
 
3.2 The Out-group Reason 
Proponents of the inefficacy claim take the communication of anger to be ineffective in 
struggles for social justice largely because communications of anger will only serve to 
antagonize the dominant group. An antagonized group is one that is likely to retaliate 
against one’s in-group, or at least avoid this group, and will therefore be unwilling to 
work towards rectifying injustice. Psychological research on intergroup conflict provides 
mounting evidence against this, however, as communications of anger have been shown 
to correlate with increased support for constructive and conciliatory action tendencies on 
behalf of dominant groups.  
One experiment, for example, probed the effect of anger communication on the 
responses of Americans to Syrian-American relations. In the experiment, Americans 
watched a short video clip about Syrian-American relations after reading a brief text. In 
the ‘anger condition’, the text described how a key Syrian leader gave an enraged speech 
that was aggressive towards the US. In a ‘hope condition’, the text described the leader’s 
hopeful view on the resolution of the conflict. And finally, in the neutral condition, non-
emotional factual information was relayed in the text about the Syrian leader’s speech. 
American subjects were then asked to register their support for conciliatory policies, such 
as continuing exports of food and medicine to Syria, and accepting Syria’s request for the 
US to fund humanitarian projects in Syria (Tagar et al., 2011).  
The Out-group Reason for holding the inefficacy claim would plausibly predict 
Americans to become antagonized by, and respond retributively to, displays and 
communications of anger. Nussbaum’s view would, therefore, predict support for 
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conciliatory policies to be lowest in the anger condition. The view would plausibly expect 
increased support for conciliatory policies in the neutral control condition because 
participants would be able to think clearly about the conflict at hand, and not be negatively 
biased by anger. The view would additionally either expect similarly increased support 
for conciliatory policies in the hope condition as well, or it would predict support for 
conciliatory policies to be highest in the hope condition, as a positive outlook is being 
conveyed. 
Contrary to these predictions, the study found support for conciliatory policies to 
be highest in the anger condition. Support for conciliatory policies was not only higher in 
the anger condition compared to the control condition, but the anger condition even saw 
significantly higher levels of support for conciliatory policies than were observed in the 
hope condition. This starkly opposes the predictions we would expect of the inefficacy 
claim, and suggests that anger communication has an important role to play in inter-group 
conflict resolution. Mounting evidence supports the main finding of this study, as anger 
communication has been observed to increase dominant group support for conciliatory 
policies in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, US race-relations (Shuman et al., 
2018), and cases of xenophobia (de Vos et al., 2013). The Out-group Reason for holding 
the inefficacy claim is therefore challenged by evidence that the communication of anger 
from a disadvantaged group often actually increases dominant group support for 
conciliatory policies.  
In one of the above-mentioned studies, focused on xenophobia, researchers 
investigated how the communication of anger plays such beneficial roles in inter-group 
conflict. One might think that perhaps it is fear of the enraged group that causes the 
increase in support for conciliatory policies on behalf of the dominant group. Indeed, 
Nussbaum notes that in so far as anger can act as an effective deterrent to keep others 
from infringing upon one’s rights, it does so by inspiring fear which is “not likely to lead 
to a future of stability or peace” (2015: 55). Contrary to this, however, increased levels 
of empathy were observed in the dominant group following anger communication from 
an oppressed group (de Vos et al., 2013). Indeed, empathy for the oppressed group was 
actually highest in the anger communication condition. This suggests that anger 
communication is a potentially optimal way of recruiting the empathy of dominant group 
members that are the target of anger, and that this in turn mediates their increase in support 
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for conciliatory policies.13 This suggests that empathy for, rather than fear of, the 
oppressed group may be causing the positive effects of anger observed in other studies.  
In a follow-up study, de Vos et al. (2016) found the appropriateness of the anger 
to moderate its positive effects. In other words, anger communication increased empathy 
in the dominant group when the dominant group saw the oppressed group’s anger as a 
justified response to the situation at hand. This highlights a key moderator that helps 
determine when anger communication is likely to cause the out-group to respond 
empathetically and support constructive policies.  
In sum, we first saw that empirical work supports a vital role for anger in 
motivating constructive collective action. In addition to this, studies also showed the 
communication of anger on behalf of those oppressed to trigger dominant group support 
for constructive and conciliatory actions. Both reasons for holding the inefficacy claim 
are therefore challenged by recent empirical work.  
Against any charge of having cherry picked the experimental work I rely upon, it 
is crucial to note that the trend in the experimental literatures I invoke have long departed 
from debates over whether anger is constructive or not in collective action and inter-group 
disputes. Instead, they focus on trying to uncover key moderators that determine when 
anger is destructive or constructive, so as to better understand and aid conflicts. The 
underlying commitment to anger’s motivational pluripotency is clear and widespread 
(Spring et al., 2018). This should be reflected in contemporary philosophical treatments 
of anger, and the relevance of particular moderators attended to. The above considerations 
suggest that we should drop the inefficacy claim, at least regarding anger’s role in inter-
group conflict resolution. If we do so, what does this mean for the nature claim? I turn to 
this question now. 
 
4. Anger’s Objects  
 
The question that arises once we take Nussbaum’s inefficacy claim to be misguided, or, 
at the very least, overly simplistic, is whether we should do away with the traditional 
retributive view of anger’s nature altogether. We seem to have two choices here. Either 
we stick with the traditional nature claim, and take anger’s oft constructive role in 
fighting for justice to be an exception to anger’s typically retributive nature, in which case 
an explanation must be given for why anger behaves uncharacteristically in the social 
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justice case; or, we take anger’s constructive role in social justice to be evidence of 
something important about anger’s nature. What exactly this might be must be cashed 
out, but any account of this sort will involve a rejection, or at the very least a modification, 
of the nature claim. I argue that we should pursue an option of the second, rather than the 
first, type. After this, I sketch a positive proposal of the second type. 
One option open to anyone wishing to secure a fundamental role for anger in the 
fight against social injustice, is to do so by distancing anger in these cases from cases of 
everyday anger. Doing so involves casting anger’s constructive role in fighting social 
injustice as a special, or deviant, case that departs from anger’s nature. Interpersonal 
anger, i.e. anger felt for one person by another, is taken to be the paradigmatic case of 
everyday anger, where one’s reasons for anger relate to interpersonal betrayals or harms. 
In line with the nature claim, everyday interpersonal anger is, on Nussbaum’s (2015; 
2016) view, ineffective at bringing about interpersonal resolutions as well. By 
constitutively involving an aim for payback, everyday interpersonal anger may prompt 
retributive behavior that escalates the dispute, proving counterproductive for the angry 
party. Everyday anger typically has an individual to blame and enact payback over. Anger 
in the case of social injustice, however, might be less destructive because payback cannot 
be exacted against a particular person easily. This is, perhaps, because there is often no 
adequate individual to blame in those scenarios where anger is felt towards groups, 
institutions or systems, and hence payback is perhaps a less immediate concern than real 
change.14  
Rosen (in progress) and Swaine (1996) have made independent cases for the 
constructive role of anger in struggles for social justice that hinge on anger being, in these 
cases, atypical for its lack of a clear agent(s) to blame. That is, as the object of anger is 
not typically an individual in such cases, payback cannot be straightforwardly exacted. 
Such a view maintains a commitment to the nature claim, as anger is still by nature 
punitive. Cases of constructive everyday anger are seen as outliers, and the constructive 
role granted of anger in promoting social justice is taken to hinge on a sort of fluke in the 
natural functioning of anger; that anger is not able to live out its natural function of 
procuring payback or retribution.  
An immediate problem with such a view is that it endorses an implausibly dire 
picture of everyday anger. The view takes a version of the inefficacy claim to apply to 
paradigmatic cases of anger, whereby anger is ineffective and often counterproductive at 
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resolving interpersonal conflict for reasons analogous to the In-group and Out-group 
reasons in the case of social justice. This doesn’t sit well with empirical evidence, as 
experimental work challenges the predictions that interpersonal anger typically motivates 
destructive behaviour, or that it tends to antagonize its recipient. Briefly, with regards to 
the types of action interpersonal anger motivates, a canonical study by Averill (1983) 
found a higher percentage of non-aggressive than aggressive action tendencies in people 
experiencing anger. Although there is robust evidence that, on economic distribution 
paradigms, angered individuals on average respond more punitively to unfair economic 
distributions than to fair economic distributions, recent work has observed that angered 
individuals still choose behaviours that are economically cooperative in response to unfair 
economic distributions (Klimecki et al., 2018). This suggests that anger may not typically 
motivate retributive actions towards the individuals it is directed at. Which actions anger 
motivates is likely to be more a question of context than object. Indeed, much like the 
social justice case, the ability of the target of anger to change may be key to determining 
whether interpersonal anger motivates constructive behaviour or payback oriented 
behaviour. A study on adolescent responses to bullying for example, found implicit 
beliefs about bullies to predict desires for revenge (Yeager et al., 2011). Greater desire 
for revenge was observed in participants who believed that the bully had fixed character 
traits. The reverse was found for participants that believed that the bully’s character was 
changeable. By highlighting the changeability of the target of anger as a moderator 
affecting desires for revenge, the interpersonal case seems to bear striking similarities to 
the social justice case.  
Similarly, as opposed to antagonizing the object of anger and promoting 
retaliatory behavior on their behalf, the communication of anger has been observed to 
trigger increased social support in close relationships (Yoo et al., 2011), as well as 
increase personal gains in interpersonal financial negotiations (Van Kleef and Côté, 
2007). The latter study pinpointed the appropriateness of anger as a key determinant of 
anger’s beneficial effects in interpersonal negotiations. The constructive effects of anger 
were highest when the anger was seen as justified, as the offender compensated the low 
status party in these cases. This points to the crucial role of the appropriateness of anger 
in moderating whether the anger is well received or not. This again suggests that 
interpersonal anger is far closer to anger in the social justice case; as appropriateness 
similarly acts as a moderator over anger’s beneficial effects.  
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We are left with little reason to think that anger in interpersonal contexts is more 
retributive than anger in social injustice cases. The studies above suggest interpersonal 
anger plays robust beneficial roles and that anger’s effects are moderated by analogous 
factors seen to be key in the social justice case: the appropriateness of anger and the 
changeability of the object of anger. Given that interpersonal anger is the paradigmatic 
case of having a clear target object to blame and enact retribution over, the constructive 
role of anger in these cases suggests that the constructive effects observed of anger in 
cases of social injustice does not hinge on lacking straightforward targets. In light of this, 
the move to sideline social justice cases of anger as atypical seems unpromising, and 
therefore commitment to the nature claim is hard to maintain.  
 
5. Anger’s Desires 
 
I argue for an alternative view; one that secures anger a constructive role in the fight 
against social injustice, in line with, rather than despite, its nature. This will be a sketch, 
but one that I think more promissing than the other options on the table. We have seen 
that we have much reason to reject a traditional view, such as Nussbaum’s (2015; 2016), 
that takes anger to be constitutively tied to payback or retribution. We therefore have 
reason to rethink the nature claim. I take the empirical work discussed so far to suggest 
that the nature claim is unlikely to be true of anger. Specifically, I take it to fit well with 
a view whereby two distinct desires are central to anger: a desire for retribution and a 
desire for recognition. I take there to be certain moderators that are key to determining 
which desire is at play in a given case of anger.   
Although the empirical work above can only provide indirect and suggestive 
evidence for which desires are at play in anger, the phenomenology of anger favours the 
existence of two distinct desires. Imagine your friend Mark manages somehow to steal 
your inheritance. You would surely want to make him suffer for committing this wrong 
against you. You may make him suffer by cutting him out of your social circle, suing 
him, defaming his character, or threatening him with physical violence. Your anger would 
be aimed at Mark’s punishment. Let’s suppose now that you fail to act on your anger. 
This could occur for a range of reasons, perhaps there was high social pressure not to act, 
or perhaps you merely lacked the opportunity. The desire to make Mark suffer is still 
central to your anger in such cases. Indeed, you are likely to hope for things to go badly 
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for Mark, and become happy upon hearing about his own hardship, even if this news 
comes years later and is entirely unrelated to you. Your desire for suffering is satisfied in 
hearing this news, and you see his pain as deserved.  
Now imagine you are angry at your mother for not being there for you throughout 
your divorce. When you needed her support the most, your mother decided to go on a 
spontaneous three-month long holiday abroad. Your anger at your mother would be 
entirely justified, but it is unlikely that you would wish to ensure her social exclusion, or 
defame her character. Nor would you want to make her suffer physically, or hope for 
things to go badly for her in the future. Your anger’s goal does not seem to be that your 
mother suffer, but rather, to make her understand what she has done. Whereas Mark’s 
suffering satisfied your anger’s desire for payback, your mother’s suffering will not 
satisfy your anger in this case. This is because your anger at your mother does not involve 
a desire for payback but rather for recognition. Your anger’s desire for recognition will 
be satisfied by your mother’s genuine acknowledgement of the wrong she has committed 
against you. This will involve your mother sharing your appraisal of her actions towards 
you as unjust. This case of anger involves a desire for recognition as it aims for an 
epistemic change in the offender.15  
I think anger aimed at recognition is a common phenomenon in our daily lives, 
and not at all restricted to cases where the emotion is felt towards a family member or 
close friend. Many cases where retributive actions are pursued may actually aim for 
epistemic changes rather than suffering. Indeed, that anger aims for something akin to 
recognition, as opposed to retribution, has long been noted (Smith, 1976; Strawson, 1962; 
Darwall, 2013; Srinivasan, 2018), yet the dominance of the traditional retributive view of 
anger has not waned. I take retributive and recognitional aims to both be typical of anger. 
This amounts to a pluralist account of the emotion.16 Desires for retribution attempt to 
bend others to one’s will, while the desires for recognition attempt to have the agent’s 
moral appraisals shared by the targets of anger. Each desire involves associated 
satisfaction conditions, suffering and understanding respectively. I take Nussbaum to 
equate anger to what I have characterized as anger that aims for retribution, while at best 
underestimating, and at worst outright denying, the existence of anger aimed at 
recognition.   
A pluralist account of anger can deliver on the phenomenological variability of 
our anger experience, as well as more readily make sense of the experimental evidence 
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regarding anger’s role in collective action and intergroup conflict. These studies showed 
the In-group and Out-group reasons for the Inefficacy Claim not to hold for many cases 
of anger. These are ones which desires for recognition help make sense of. Anger was 
observed to motivate actions such as protesting, petitioning, and lobbying, which are 
communicative actions that typically aim for recognition rather than punishment. In terms 
of the Out-group Reason, I contend that the dominant group can understand anger as 
either an appraisal of injustice looking to be shared, or as a wish for payback. Dominant 
groups are more likely to empathize with the angry group when they perceive anger as 
involving desires for recognition, making them more likely to support conciliatory 
policies towards them. When anger is perceived as a desire for retribution the dominant 
group will be more likely to pursue retaliatory actions against the oppressed group, or 
withdraw from any engagement with them as anger is perceived as a threat. Although 
action types don’t line up neatly with distinct desires (we can seek recognition through 
aggressive actions, for example) the role of appropriateness in moderating anger’s 
efficacy in struggles for social justice suggests that epistemic aims of anger are central.17 
Even aggressive anger-triggered actions may be met with empathy when anger is seen as 
appropriate, as in such cases the targeted group shares the appraisal of those in anger.  
I take the moderators highlighted to be important for three main reasons. First, 
they highlight a key contextual feature, the changeability of the targets of anger, which 
moderates over which desire – retribution or recognition – is likely to be at play in a token 
case of anger. Second, the moderators inform the conditions under which anger is 
effective in struggles for social justice. When the targets of anger are seen as capable of 
change, anger tends to involve desires for recognition. Desires for recognition typically 
trigger actions that are primarily communicative, and which make clear the reasons for 
anger. This allows the targets of anger to share in the appraisal of a relevant situation as 
unjust. We saw that perceiving anger as appropriate led the targets of anger to in turn 
support conciliatory actions towards angry groups. When these conditions are in place 
then, anger is effective in fights against social injustice, without incurring questions of 
morality. Lastly, the moderators shed light on why the traditional view of anger has been 
so prevalent. I turn to this now. 
Recall that the empirical work suggested that retributive actions are more 
prevalent when the target of anger is seen as unchangeable, and that the targets of anger 
are more likely to retaliate against angry groups when anger is perceived as inappropriate. 
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This is actually an apt description of the state of affairs in societies structured by 
oppression. Power imbalances can structure which instances of anger are seen as 
appropriate, such that the status quo is perpetuated and injustices left unaddressed. This 
means that the anger of the oppressed will more easily be dismissed as inappropriate due 
to dominant ideology (Frye, 1983; Spelman, 1989). Relatedly, the angry are less likely to 
take their targets to be changeable in real life cases of entrenched social injustice, given 
their lived history of struggle, and will therefore be more likely to act retributively. The 
empirical work surveyed then seems to suggest that anger is least effective under 
conditions of severe social injustice, where moderators that favour retributive actions on 
behalf of the angry group, as well as against them, are deeply engrained features of that 
society. Does this mean that Nussbaum, and others who endorse the inefficacy claim, get 
things right regarding anger under conditions of oppression? No, we have reason to think 
that, despite moderators that favour inefficacy claim being more prevalent under 
conditions of social injustice, anger is still an extremely effective way of constructively 
fighting against social injustice.  
For example, although under conditions of social injustice the dominant group 
might tend to dismiss the anger of the oppressed as inappropriate, there are many cases 
of dominant group members becoming allies of oppressed groups under conditions of 
severe oppression (see Brown 2002, for example). From the studies surveyed in section 
3 above, we have reason to think that anger is one of the most effective ways of recruiting 
allies, as anger was seen to recruit more support from out-group members than neutral 
communications of wrongdoing (Tagar et al., 2011). Furthermore, studies have shown 
that having even just one individual member of an out-group share the in-group’s anger, 
results in the in-group seeing the out-group as potential allies. This in turn correlates with 
in-group support for non-retrubitive actions towards the outgroup (see McDonald et al., 
2017). This highlights the crucial effect of recruiting allies under conditions of social 
injustice. Recruiting even one single member of the outgroup seems to impact the 
perceived changeability of the out-group immensely, and increased changeability was 
one of the moderators highlighted that favoured anger’s constructive effects. This 
suggests that even amidst widespread dismissal of the anger of the oppressed, securing 
even a few out-group allies is not only possible, but perhaps most effectively achieved 
through displays of anger. Individual allies can be sensitive to the epistemic value of in-
group anger, and this can lead to changes in the key moderators that favour anger’s 
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efficacy. This suggests that anger has a robustly effective and constructive role to play in 
struggles against social injustice.  
What seems plausible, is that anger is most retributive in ‘nothing to lose’ 
scenarios, where attempts at recruiting allies have proved futile, and one’s anger has been 
systematically dismissed as inappropriate. ‘Nothing to lose’ situations will be ones where 
the two moderators indicated in the empirical literature – perceptions of appropriateness 
and perceptions of liability to change – are most clearly operative. This sheds some light 
on why the traditional view of anger has been so prevalent. It is plausible that anger will 
have commonly manifested itself as retributive in unjust societal arrangements, where the 
two moderators highlighted would have been entrenched. This may have led to retribution 
being viewed as part of anger’s nature. It would have been in the interest of those in power 
to dismiss anger as inappropriate and to perpetuate the view that anger is intrinsically 
retributive. When anger is perceived as inappropriate, retaliatory actions are sought on 
behalf of the targets of anger against angry groups. This would further entrench 
perceptions of the targets of anger as having fixed and uncompromising characters. This, 
in effect, would ‘prove’ the traditional retributive construal of anger correct, much to the 
benefit of those with a vested interest in maintaining the prevailing status quo. Once 
anger’s retributive tendencies are understood as dependent on specific features of the very 
injustices it seeks to combat, rather than understood as constitutive of anger’s nature, the 
recognitional aims of the emotion can emerge, allowing its efficacy to be uncovered as 
well as bolstered. A view of anger committed to the nature claim and inefficacy claim, 
then, is guilty of reading into the very nature of anger, what on my account are contingent 
features of anger in specific contexts, particularly ‘nothing to lose’ scenarios. In so far as 
Nussbaum captures retributive forms of anger successfully then, she does so by obscuring 




I have argued that Nussbaum’s attack on the political efficacy of anger does not survive 
empirical scrutiny. Doing so led me to recommend against the traditional construal of 
anger as constitutively retributive, in favour of a pluralistic account where anger’s robust 
ties to a distinct desire, a desire for recognition, is made central. Is anger that aims for 
recognition the same as Nussbaum’s transition-anger? If it is, then Nussbaum is pushed 
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not only to count transition-anger as a bonified form of anger, but to grant that non-
retributive anger is far more common than her account allows. Anger has emerged as an 
effective, and morally unproblematic, means of confronting social injustices. The 
oppressed should not avoid anger. As the traditional retributive view of anger loses hold, 
the full efficacy and meaning of anger will continue to emerge.  
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1 The notion of social justice I employ throughout is a thin one. I take social justice to be (non-exhaustively) 
concerned with generating fair patterns of rights, opportunities, and wealth in a society. Such a conception 
is intended to capture a fundamental notion of social justice without taking sides on particular theories or 
forms of justice. I take what I have to say about anger to be at least in principle applicable to whichever 
theory of justice one might favour. 
2 I make use of an intuitive notion of desire throughout. I take desires to: a) dispose one to act in ways that 
aim to achieve the desire’s aim, and b) to be satisfied when the actual state of affairs in the world matches 
the desire’s aim. 
3 This view is shared by Stoics such as anger’s most famous critic Seneca (On Anger) 
4 This is actually a departure from the Aristotelian account of anger where for revenge to be enacted the 
offender must know by whose hand, as well as for what reason, he suffers (Rhet 1380b22-25). 
5 I follow Nussbaum (2015; 2016) in using the terms ‘payback’, ‘retribution’ and ‘revenge’ 
interchangeably.  
6 Adams (1986) and Cogley (2014) take this autobiographical evidence to establish the exact opposite: that 
anger-motivated action is extremely effective and prevalent amongst leaders of political movements. 
7 Lepoutre (2018) and Srinivasan (2018) discuss the ‘counterproductivity objection’ and the 
‘counterproductivity critique’ against anger respectively. My target is the weaker claim regarding anger’s 
inefficacy. In targeting the weaker claim, my argument challenges also the stronger claim regarding anger’s 
counterproductivity.  
8 As does Pettigrove (2012). 
9 On anger’s value in the psychology of the oppressed see Spelman (1989: 266), hooks (1995: 17), Fanon 
(2008: 94), Yancy (2008: 847) and Leboeuf (2017). A common theme is that in anger one rejects the self-
image imposed by the oppressor, and affirms one’s agency. On anger’s epistemic value see Frye (1983), 
Friedman (1986), Jaggar (1989) and Bell (2009). Anger plays a number of epistemic roles. It allows direct 
apprehension of injustice (often constituting one’s only means of apprehension), as well as indirect mapping 
of oppression through the observation of when and where one’s anger is systematically dismissed (Frye, 
1983). Additionally, collective scrutiny of shared anger plays roles in the generation of concepts that aid 
political progress. Independent to anger’s psychological and epistemic effects, becoming angry when there 
is justifying reason to, is thought to itself be intrinsically valuable (see Srinivasan 2018). 
10 Lepoutre (2018) is a recent exception. His argument relies on historical examples of political speeches 
where mine is informed by recent work in psychology. 
11 In psychology, group-based anger is taken to be anger that is experienced by individuals “as a result of 
their identification with a group or social category” (Mackie et al., 2000). This understanding of collective 
or group-based emotions is distinct from, and likely agnostic about, the problem in philosophy of mind as 
to whether there are such things as ontologically collective emotions (see Krueger, 2015). I remain agnostic 
about such problems and follow the psychological construal of group-anger throughout. 
12  Anger and instrumental reasoning were measured by asking participants to rate how strongly they agreed 
with statements like: ‘I am furious about tuition rises’, ‘I am irritated by tuition rises’ in the case of anger, 
and for instrumental reasoning about group efficacy: ‘I think that students can stop the introduction of 
tuition fees’, ‘I think students have already lost the fight against tuition fees’. 
13 Mediators, in psychology, are variables that speak to how or why certain effects occur. In this case, 
empathy is a mediator because it can be seen as an intermediary step that explains the effect of anger on 
outgroup support for constructive actions. 
14 Everyday interpersonal anger and anger in social justice cases do not come neatly apart. First, for the 
oppressed, anger at social injustice can be their ‘everyday’. Additionally, although the objects of anger in 
cases of social injustice are often social objects, such as groups or institutions, anger at specific individuals, 
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for reasons pertaining to social injustice (such as sexism and racism) are common. For simplicity of 
treatment, and to mirror the experimental work, I treat interpersonal anger and anger in cases of social 
injustice as conceptually distinct. The relevant distinction seems to me not to pertain to whether the object 
of anger is an individual or not, but to whether the reasons for anger involve group-based harms or not. My 
point in this section is that anger at individuals, for reasons independent to group membership (what has 
been called paradigmatic or everyday anger), has much more in common with anger in social injustice 
cases, such that accounting for anger’s differential effects in terms of its objects is not a promising move.   
15 Cogley (2014), Srinivasan (2018) and Lepoutre (2018) have recently discussed anger’s recognitional or 
epistemic aims as well. 
16 This pluralist view is compatible with a number of specific accounts on which I remain agnostic here. 
For example, anger could be constitutively linked to desires for either recognition or retribution. 
Alternatively, anger could be causally linked to these desires. The latter option leaves open the possibility 
that anger also bears strong causal links to additional desires, as well as allowing the possibility that a token 
case of anger can involve both recognitional and retributive desires. I think the causal rather than 
constitutive account is more plausible but do not argue for it here. 
17 The thought that emotions are appropriate or reason-responsive is widespread in moral philosophy 
(Skorupski, 2010; Raz, 2011; Scanlon, 2014), feminist philosophy (Frye, 1983; Jaggar,1989; Lorde, 1997; 
Bell, 2009) and philosophy of emotion (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000; Deonna and Teroni, 2012; Tappolet, 
2016). It is therefore common to think of emotions as amenable to normative assessment, such that some 
emotions are appropriate, or fitting, while others are not. Appropriate emotions are typically those whose 
objects in some way instantiate the evaluative property in question, fear is justified when the object of your 
fear is in fact dangerous or poses you a threat, for example. Prudential and moral considerations are thought 
to be relevant to the normative assessment of emotions as well (it might be inappropriate to laugh during 
an academic talk, even though your friend’s whispered comment was funny), but these considerations are 
thought of as the ‘wrong sort’ of reasons in so far as we are concerned with whether the emotion gets things 
right about the world (see D’Arms and Jacobson 2000). 
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